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A CRITICISM OF THE RAILROAD CORPORATION LAW OF PENNSYLVANIA.
"Laws," says Voltaire, "are made spasmodically, haphazard, unmethodically, just as cities are built. Take
the market-places and the wharves, the narrow streets
and the crooked alleys of Paris, and compare them with
the Louvre and the Tuileries: that is what our laws look
Eke... The burning of London was what made her a great
city. If you w4nt good laws, burn yours and make new
ones. "o

Radical advice this; and yet an examination of our
Pennsylvania legislation will show that any attempt at
systematic constructive work must be preceded by an
apparently destructive attack upon our statutes. Within recent years there has been throughout the United
States a general tendency toward the revision and codification of legislation, and Pennsylvania owes to this
tendency such valuable acts as the "Service Act," the
"Bills and Notes Act," and the "Mechanics' Lien Law,"
and soon will have it to thank for a comprehensible code
of divorce law.
The importance of these reforms is tinmeasurable, and
31
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yet the hecessity for none of them was equal to the present necessity for a reform of our corporation law. Statistics need not be quoted to demonstrate the sudden
and immense deevlopment of this phase of industrial
activity. The laws passed when corporations were in
their infancy were found poorly to fit them in their
healthy maturity, and in most of the States the legislators have been busy altering the statutes which could
be adapted to the new conditions, and casting aside those
so inadequate as to be not worth fixing up. Particularly
has this been true in the States nearest to us: New Jersey,
which we usually consider ultra-conservative, revised her
corporation law in 1896, and the last Legislature consti•tuted a commission to present as soon as possible a more
up-to-date code. Delaware codified her corporation law
in I9o, New York in 1892, West Virginia in 1899, Maine
in 1904, Massachusetts in 1903, Connecticut in 1903 and
Ohio in 1905.

Pennsylvania, on the other hand, has not made a single
attempt to review her corporation law since the General
Corporation Act of 1874 was passed. It is not that the
subject is of less moment here than in other States. During the last adminstration, that of Governor Stone, there
were granted 5,030 charters, not including those granted
by the Courts. Nor has the disrepair of this branch
of our law escaped notice. In his message to the Legislature of 19o5, Governor Pennypacker wrote, "There are
many incongruities in our laws with regard to corporations, due largely to the fact that the legislation has often
been enacted without sufficiently considering its relation
to the general system, and they ought to be corrected.
Probably the best method would be to provide for a commission of expert lawyers, to be appointed by the Governor, who could go over the whole subject carefully and
report a code or what changes may be necessary." A
bill was introduced to carry this recommendation into
effect, but it did not survive the introduction.
It is proposed in this paper to consider only the corporation law bearing on railroads, and even that part of our
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legislation is so voluminous that it can be discussed only
incompletely, our thought being that if we can show even
a few serious defects, others will apply themselves to the
study of the questions involved, will discover the many
faults which we may have failed to notice, and will take
steps for their correction.'
When we recollect that the capitalization of our railroads exceeds the assessed value of all of our taxable
real estate, we can realize the gravity of the reproach that
"legislation is scandalously loose in Pennsylvania touching railroads,"' but when we remember that this legislation began in 1823 and has gone on with fits and
starts to the present time, we appreciate that it could not
be expected to be either accurate or consistent. The
Secretary of Internal Affairs, who has general supervision over railroads, complains that the Act of 14 May,
IThe word "railroads" unless otherwise indicated, is intended to
designate railroads authorized to carry freight. Formerly railroads

were classified as "steam railroads" and "street passenger railways,"
but now that the Supreme Court has decided that "steam railroads"
may use electricity as a motive power: Howley v. Cetral Valley R. R.
Co., 213 Pa. 36 (i9o5), the former term has become inaccurate, and
since elevated and underground passenger railways may be formed
under the Act of 7 June, igoi, P. . 523, under entirely different conditions and with entirely different powers than "street passenger
railways," the latter term, too, no longer is appropriate. The latest
legislation drawing a distinction between railroads, divides them into
"railroad comnies" and "passenger railway companies:" Act of
5 March, i9o3,P. L. i3, but inasmuch as a railroad certainly is a passenger railway, this terminology is extremely artificial. Before the Act
of 7 June, 19ox, before mentioned, it would have been correct to distingpish between railroad companies possessing, and railroad companies
not possessing, the right of eminent domain, but that Act, bestowing
the right of eminent domain on so-called passenger railways, made this
test insufficient. If the Legislature give to companies incorporated
under the "Street Passenger Railway Act" of 14 May, 1889, P. L. 211,
and under the "Elevated and Underground Passenger Railway Act"
of 7 June, i9o, P.L.52 3 , the right to carry freight, as it seems inclined
to do, it will be impossible to differentiate the various kinds of railroads
except by speaking of them as incorporated under the respective acts
of which they availed themselves. Some day there will be one act
governing all railroads, as there was from the time the Act of i9 February, 1849, P. L. 79, was passed, until the Act of 4 April, i868, P. L. 62,
was adopted, and we shall be as much ridiculed for speaking of a "street
passenger railway," as distinct from a "steam railroad," as we ridicule
those who spent their days in debating whether an action sounded in
debt or in covenant.
2 Per Woodward, C. J., in Com. v. Cross Cit R. R. Co., 53 Pa. 62
(x866), at 68.
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1889, P. L. 211, providing for the incorporation and regulation of street passenger railways, already is antiquated
and in need of revision
It can be imagined how much
more in need of revision is the law for the incorporation
of railroads, twenty years older than that Act, and the
law for their government, forty years older.
First to be considered are the Acts forI.

THE

INCORPORATION
ROAD

AND

ORGANIZATION

OF

RAIL-

COMPANIES.

Prior to the Constitution of 1874, the creation of corporations by special act of the Legislature was not only a
permissible, but in most cases the only possible method
of incorporation. General acts did not exist except
for few kinds of corporations. Among these were railroads. As early as the Act of i9 February, 1849, P. L. 79,
it had been provided that all railroad companies incorporated under special acts should have the same specified
rights and privileges except as otherwise stated in the act
of incorporation.4 The Act of 4 April, 1868, P. L. 62, permitted any persons who should comply with its formal
requisites, to form a railroad company, and to build or
operate a railroad on the terms prescribed by the Act of
1849 for specially incorporated railroads. There was
from 1868 until 1874 nothing to prevent the Legislature
from chartering railroad companies specially, and conferring privileges not granted either by the Act of 1849 or
by that of i868, and many railroads were so chartered
after the latter Act went into force, up to 1874.
The Act of 1868 authorized the formation of companies
"for the purpose of constructing, maintaining and operating a railroad for public use in the conveyance of persons
and property, or for the purpose of maintaining and op-

2 Report

Sec. Int. Aff., 19o2-3, p. xlv.
The Lateral Railroad Act of 5 May, 1832, P.L.Sox, has not been
overlooked, but it is not relevant to this article, because it contemplates the construction of railroads, not by corporations, but by individuals. It constitutes probably the only legislation in Pennsylvania granting to unincorporated individuals the right of eminent
domain.
4
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erating any unincorporated railroad already constructed
for like public use." This of course was broad enough to
include railroads of any length or gauge, but in 1871 an
Act was passed providing for the formation of companies
to construct, maintain and operate railroads for public
use, not over five miles long, and giving to them all the
powers granted in the Act of 1868: Act of 28 April, 1871,
P. L. 246. Sec. 2 of the Act permits any corporation
formed under the Act of 1868, and electing to organize
under the provisions of the Act of 1871, to do so, if a
majority of its stock so determines, upon filing with the

Secretary of the Commonwealth a certificate of its action
and a copy of its articles of association, "and any corporation failing, refusing or neglecting so to do, shall be
subject to a fine of $50.00."
The Act of 1871, it is submitted, is, and always was,
absolutely useless and unnecessary. The Act of 1868
had fixed no maxinium or minimum length of road to
be built by a company incorporated under it: the only
reference in the entire Act to the subject of length, consists in the requirement that the articles of association
shall state "the length of said road as near as may be,"
and it has been decided expressly that roads less than five
miles long could be built under the provisions of the Act
of 1868.' Admitting that a company to construct a
road less than five miles long could have been formed
under the Act of 1868, one naturally would suppose that
the Act of 1871 was passed either to encourage by greater
liberality, or to discourage by greater strictness, the building of these short roads. The last sentence of the Act,
providing that companies formed under the Act of 1868,
which had not built more than five miles of road, might
organize under the Act of 1871. if they elected to, and imposing a fine if they did not (evidently, did not file a certificate when they had elected to organize under the Act),
would lead one to suppose that the intention was to impose
harder conditions on companies organized under the Act of
6Volmer's App., ii5 Pa. x66,x886:
212 Pa.io5, 1905.

den R. R, Co.,

Sparks v. Philadelphia & Cam-

A CRITICISM OF THE RAILROAD

1871. Btit there is nothing in the Act which indicates what
the harder conditions there are, and indeed inasmuch as
the Act of 1871 in no way prohibits companies proposing
to build railroads under five miles, to organize under the
Act of i868, one can not suppose that the Act of 187r
was intended to provide a stricter method of incorporation.
On the other hand does the Act of 1871 make it easier
to form companies to build these short roads, than the
Act of i868 did? The only difference between the two
Acts is, that three persons may form a company under
the Act of 1871, whereas it required not less than nine
to incorporate under the Act of 1868. But this it is submitted is a very unsubstantial advantage, because the
other provisions of the Act of i868 apply, which means
that the same amount of capital must be subscribed and
paid in per mile, and that there must be a president and
not less than six directors (Sec.. 7 of Act 1868).6 Again,
the incorporators under the Act of 1868 not having to
be subscribers, and those under the Act of 1871 being
required to be subscribers, the aalvantage if any would
seem to be with the Act of 1868. Even granting, however,
that two less persons are required to incorporate under
the Act of 1871 than under that of i868, and conceding
that this is an important benefit, the question arises, why
should a company already incorporated under the Act
of 1868, and therefore not in any way handicapped by
the provision of the Act of 1868 requiring nine incorporators, organize under the Act of 1871, a course of action
evidently contemplated by Sec. 2 of the latter Act? The
writer has found no answer to this question.
In 1875 the Narrow-gauge Railroad Act was passed,"
to provide for the formation of companies to construct,
maintain and operate railroads having a gauge not exceeding three feet. The Act was not passed because of
6 The Act of ig April, r9oi, P. L. 8o providing that all corporations
may have a Board of Directors consisting of three or more persons,
probably repeals Section 7 of the Act of x868. In criticising legislation,
however, it must be considered with reference to the law as it was
when the legislation under consideration was enacted.
7 r8 March, 1875, P. L. 28.
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any doubt as to'whether narrow-gauge roads could be
constructed under the Act of 1868, for the Act of ix April,
1853, P. L. 366, had given railroad companies authority
to build their roads of any desired gauge, but a substantial benefit is conferred on persons organizing under
the Act of 1853, for they may capitalize their road at
$6,ooo.oo per mile, instead of $xo,ooo.oo per mile, as
required by the Act of 1868, and only $3,000.00 per mile
need be subscribed before the recording of the articles
of association, while $5,000.00 must be subscribed in
the case of standard-gauge roads: Act of 8 June, 1874,

P. L. 277.
The third class of railroads whose incorporation is
provided for specially is that of railroads not over 15 miles
long. This was effected by the Act of 13 May 1876, P. L.
157, which permitted the incorporation of such roads

when only $2,000.00 per mile had been subscribed. Nothing was said as to the capitalization of the roads, and if
the thought of the legislature in this act was that so
short a road would require less capital proportionately
than a longer road, the Act should have reduced not only
the amount necessary to be subscribed, but also the
required capital, as it had done in the case of narrowgauge roads.8 But there are two other regards in which
the legislation concerning roads not over fifteen miles
long is more imperfect. TheActof 5 May, 1876, P. L. 1i6,
permits such roads to charge for passengers' fare up to
five cents a mile. Longer roads may not charge more
than three and a half cents.' Of course the right to
charge the higher rate is extremely valuable, and
it was perceived by the legislature that long railroads
would lease the shorter roads, and attempt to operate
them as part of a great system, at the same time charging
the five cents permitted by the Act of 5 May, 1876. Ac8 The advantage of being permitted to place the authorized capital
stock at a lower figure is that the bonus to be paid upon incorporation
thereby is lessened, that bonus being one-third of one per cent. on the
-authorized capital of the company: Act of 3 May, 1899, P. L. 189.
9 Act of i9 February, 1849, P, L. 79, Sec. 18.
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cordingly the following proviso was inserted in that Act:
"The provisions of this Act shall not apply to railroads
leased and operated by a railroad company whose main
line is more than fifteen miles in length." This is manifestly incomplete, for it does not prohibit the control
of the shorter by the longer road except through a lease,
which it is well known is but one of many methods by
which such control could be exerted. For instance, the obvious courses left open to the longer road are to consolidate
with, or acquire a majority of the stock of, the shorter
road. It thus could make of the shorter road an integral
part of its system, and still be able to take advantage of
the higher rate permitted to the short road. Again,
there is no prohibition against the lease of one fifteenmile road to another, or its purchase by, or consolidation
with, another, and while a trip over one thirty-mile road
cannot cost over $1.o5, a trip over two connecting fifteenmile roads may cost up to $1.5 o . The second anomaly
in the legislation governing, fifteen-mile roads was indicated by Governor Pennypacker in his message to the
Legislature of 1905, before referred to. The Act of 21
May, 1881, P. L. 27, is the offender. Its intention was to
provide for the extension of the lines of railroads not
over fifteen miles long, by the filing of supplemental articles
of association. No limit is placed by the Act upon the
length of the extension, so the road may become as long
as the road of any company originally incorporated under
the Act of 1868, but while the latter class of roads must
have a capital stock of $io,ooo.oo a mile, short roads extending under the Act of 1881 need have only $5,ooo.oo
of capital stock a mile. On the other hand, under the
Act of 1868, companies could incorporate when only one
half of the required capital was subscribed, while under
the Act of i88i apparently all of the required capital had
to be subscribed. We need not discuss the question
whether $ioooo.oo a mile is a proper amount of stock to
require, or whether it is good policy to permit incorporation before all of the stock is subscribed, but it seems
incontestable that if $io,ooo.oo a mile be a proper amount
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of stock to require, and one half thereof a proper subscribed
amount to require, in the case of a road originally 20
miles long, they are equally proper amounts in the case
of a road originally ten miles long, but subsequently
extended to 20 miles. Moreover, nine or more citizens
of Pennsylvania must associate to form a company under
the Act of 1868, but three persons, of whom not one
need be a citizen of Pennsylvania, may associate to build
a road under the Act of 28 April, 1871, P. L. 246, before
referred to, less than three miles long, and then thanks
to the Act of 1881 the same three men may extend their
road to 500 miles. If there be any real object in requiring nine Pennsylvania incorporators, the Act of 1881 affords a convenient way to evade its accomplishment.
This completes our consideration of the statutes bearing upon the kinds of railroads for whose incorporation
special provision is made. The next question is, who
may secure the benefit of the acts? The Act of 1868,
the Narrow-gauge Railroad Act of 1875 and the Fifteenmile Railroad Act of 1876, all require nine or more citizens of Pennsylvania to form a company, but the Act
none of 1871 permits the incorporation of three persons,
of whom need be even resident in the Commonwealth,
to build a road not over five miles long. No matter what
theory one may support as to the number or domicile
of incorporators, one cannot reconcile to it both the Act
of 1868 and that of 1871. Our own view is, that to grant
railroad charters only to tonipanies composed entirely
of Pennsylvanians is unwise, because it will increase
beyond already excessive bounds the practice of having
"dummy incorporators," or else it will act as a Chinese
wall, excluding outside capital from the State, but that
to permit the incorporation of railroad companies without any citizen of Penhisylvania is scarcely conservative
or prudent. We shold permit non-residents to be
among the incorporators of a company, but should require some if not a majority of the incorporators to
be residents. Under the General Corporation Law there
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must be three associates, of whom one at least must be a
citizen of Pennsylvania."0
The inconsistency of our legislation concerning the
amount of capital stock required to be stated in the articles of association and the amount which must be subscribed, already has been referred to. Presumably the
purpose in fixing a minimum authorized capitalization
and a minimum subscription, is to insure the financial
backing necessary for the construction of the road, but
when one considers that the same amounts are provided for a railroad like the tunnel railroad under the
Delaware River, discussed in Sparks v. Philadelphia&
Camden Railroad," the estimated cost of which is about
$2,500,0o0.00 per mile, as for an ordinary railroad in
level country, which can be built for $4,ooo.oo a mile,

the difficulty of finding a figure equally fair for the two
cases is almost insurmountable.
It has been the policy of the Legislature to require as
an evidence of good faith, that io% of the amount which
must be subscribed, be paid in cash to the directors of
the proposed company before it can be incorporated.
The object of this provision undoubtedly is good, and
it may to some extent prevent the taking of charters
merely for speculation. It is submitted, however, that
the provision is not stringent enough to meet the necessities of the case, and that it would be much better to
require the deposit of the io% paid in with the Secretary of the Commonwealth or with some other body less
likely to make the payment of the io% a mere matter
of book-keeping, not involving any actual transfer of
money. This is the method used in New Jersey, and the
provision of that law that proportionate parts of the
deposit shall be returned to the incorporators when they
have built parts of their road, is a powerful incentive to
go ahead with the work, while the fact that until the
charter is surrendered the money will not be returned,
'0 Act of May 29, 19o,
11212 Pa. io5, 19o5.

P. L. 326.
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but will be kept without allowance of interest, acts as a
strong deterrent against the obtaining of "paper charters."
Having decided what kind of a road is to be built and
having associated the requisite number of incorporators
and obtained the necessary amount of subscriptions,
articles of association are to be adopted. Their contents
are prescribed by the Act of 1868. They resemble agreements of partnership, and set out, as such agreements
would, the name of the association, its period of existence, its capital, its method of government, etc. One
criticism to be made on the requirements of the Act is,
it seems to the writer, that the route of the road need
not be indicated at all, and its termini need not be fixed
more definitely than as "the places from and to which
the road is to be constructed or maintained and operated,"
the word "place" not meaning anything less broad than
"some location, as a city, town or village."'
It is conceded that it would be difficult exactly to describe the route
of the road in advance, but it is fair to say that persons
should not be given a charter until they have in their
minds a more definite, idea of where they intend to go
than that they will construct a railroad from Philadelphia
to Pittsburg. The provision that the articles of association shall name the persons "who shall manage the
affairs of the company for the first year," also is objectionable. It has been decided, and with undoubted
correctness, that the associates before they have incorporated can not choose officers for the corporation, any
more than they could make contracts for it, and the
loose wording of the Act, which implies a contrary
principle, should be amended.' Modem ideas tend to
disapprove the granting of perpetual franchises, which
the Act of 1868 allows. "The mountains' shall sink into
the sea," says Governor Pennypacker, "in time the sun
shall disappear from the heavens, and no charter should
purport to endure forever."
12Per Snodgrass, Deputy Attorney-General, Re Pittsburg Transfer
Company., z Pa. C. C. 411 (1886).
13

Com. v. Holmes,

2o

Phila, 19o, isgo.
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The articles are executed in the proper manner, and
then forwarded to the Secretary of the Commonwealth,
together with an affidavit that the amount which must
be subscribed has been subscribed, that io% has been
paid in good faith in cash to the directors, and that it
is proposed to construct the road for which a charter
is asked.
With the filing of these articles of association and their
recording, the incorporation of the Company would be
complete in most States. But by one familiar with our
general corporation law, two more steps would be expected: the advertisement of notice of the intention to
apply for a charter, and the Governor's approval of
the articles of association and his direction that letters
patent issue, creating the associates a corporation.
The advertising of charter notices is, according to
Governor Pennypacker, 4 for the purpose of giving
any persons who might be interested adversely in the
granting of the proposed charter by the Governor, an
opportunity to protest against its approval. As a practical matter, the only persons who legitimately could
have such an interest would be stockholders in a corporation with a name so like that of the applicants that confusion would result from the similarity, and as to them
the interest of the public authorities in preventing misdelivery of mail, confusion in assessment of taxes, etc.,
is a much greater protection than an advertisement
which may not even be in a newspaper in their county,
and which is not likely to be seen by them if it is. But
whether the public derives much benefit from advertising
or not, Governor Pennypacker certainly is correct in saying, "All corporations before they can be chartered,
are required to give notice by advertisement of their
applications, except railroad and street railway companies.
It would seem to be specially important that these companies should give such notice." In the case of street
railways, this anomaly was cured by the Act of 3 May,
1905, P. L. 368, Section I, so that railroads are the only
14Donora Light, Heat and Power Company,

12

Dist. ri5, 1903.
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important class of corporations which can be chartered in
Pennsylvania without notice of the intention to apply
for a charter. 5
Few provisions of the corporation law of Pennsylvania
need revision so badly as do those which concern the
Governor's part in the incorporating of persons. In the
original Railroad Act of 1868 no mention whatever was
made of the Governor. The associates were required to
make and execute articles of association and then to file
them in the office of the Secretary of the Commonwealth,
"who shall endorse thereon the day on which they were
filed and record the same in a book to be provided by
him for that purpose; and thereupon the said articles
of association shall become and be a charter for the said
company, and the persons who have so subscribed such
articles of association, and all persons who-shall become
stockholders in such company shall be a corporation by
the name specified in such articles of association or
charter, and shall possess the powers and privileges following, to wit: to have succession by* its corporate
name," etc. That is to say, the incorporation is complete
when the articles of association are filed with the Secretary of the Commonwealth. This is the rule prevailing
in all but three or four of the States, and it seems to
have proven satisfactory in the case of railroads in
Pennsylvania until the Act of 8 June, 1874, P. L; 277 was
passed. Section 3 of this Act provided, "On filing
of the. articles of association . , . the Governor shall
isstie his letters patent creating the association aforesaid a body corporate, with power to use and enjoy
all the powers and privileges conferred by the Act aforesaid (of 1868), and the several supplements thereto."
This provision interposes between the association and the
corporation, the Governor. It seems scarcely possible
that the Act of 8 June, 1874, did not repeal the provision
of the Act of 1868 that the articles of association should
be the charter of the company and that the association
1 Ship Canal companies, whose incorporation is provided for by Act

of 24 June, 1895, P. L. 221, apparently do not have to advertise.
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should become a corporation upon filing them, for this
provision seems entirely inconsistent with the requirement
of the issue of a charter by the Governor and the creation
of the corporation by his act. The Act of 21 May, 188i,
P. L. 27, however, which provides for the extension of
roads not over fifteen miles long, makes the whole question
of when the incorporation is complete, doubtful, by providing in Section i that when the amended articles of association are filed with the Secretary of the Commonwealth they shall become a charter for the company, and
the stockholders shall be a corporation, etc. (almost in
the words of the Act of i868), and providing in Section
2 that on filing the articles the Governor shall issue his
letters patent, etc. (almost in the words of the Act of
8 June, 1874). If the associates become a corporation
upon filing their articles, one scarcely sees what additional
advantage they gain from the governor's act, and if the
two provisions can stand together in one act, as the Act
of x881 indicates that they can, the Act of June 8, 1874,
probably did not repeal the quoted sentences of the
Act of 1868 and railroads become incorporated by
filing their articles of association with the Secretary of
the Commonwealth and without any action on the part
of the Governor. - The Act of 8 June, 1874, probably was

enacted in imitation of Section 3 of the General Corporation Act of 29 April, 1874, P. L. 73, which reads as
follows: "The said certificate (of incorporation), accompanied with proof of publication of notice as hereinbefore
provided, shall then be produced to the Governor of this
Commonwealth; who shall examine the same, and if he
finds it to be in proper form and within the purposes
named in the second class, specified in the foregoing section, he shall approve thereof and endorse his approval
thereon, and direct letters patent to issue in the usual
form, incorporating the subscribers," etc. Strangely
enough it never has been decided judicially whether this
provision enabled an applicant to mandamus the governor to approve articles of association if they were "in
proper form and within the purposes named in the

CORPORATION LAW OF PENNSYLVANIA

second class" of the Act of 1874. Attorney-General
Carson in an elaborate argument published in his report
for 19o3-4 ' maintains that the Governor can not be
mandamused to approve articles of association,-firstly,
because of his position as head of the Executive Department of the government, and secondly, because such
approval is a discretionary and not a ministerial act. In
support of this second contention, Mr. Carson relies
largely on Governor Pennypacker's opinion in the case
of the Donora Light, Heat and Power Company, 7 in
which the following language is used: "The question
turns upon the meaning of the words 'in proper form'
and 'approve.' The Act does not say that he shall certify
that the forms have been faithfully followed, but that
he shall approve of the incorporation. At the time of
the passage of the Act of April 29, 1874, the word 'approve' had a certain precise historical meaning. Up to
that time, for a long series of years, charters had been
granted by special acts of assembly, which only became
laws by the assent of the Governor, and that assent
was shown by the use of the word 'approved.' When
the Legislature used the word 'approve' they must
With
have been aware of its special significance."
this argument in mind, let us look at the Act of 8
June, 1874, admitting that it repealed as to the
completion of incorporation, the Act of 1886. Not a
word about "proper form" or "approve:" on filing the
articles of association, "the Governor shall issue his
letters patent." Could there be a more mandatory sentence framed than this? However correct Mr. Carson
may be in claiming that the Governor's action under the
Act of 29 April, 1874, is discretionary, it is submitted
that an application of his reasoning in support of that
claim to the Act of 8 June, 1874, shows that the Legislature intended to give the governor no discretion in the
granting of railroad charters. If now Mr. Carson's first
argument be admitted, that the performance even of a
16 Page 359 et seq.

1712 Dist. i1S, x9o3.
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ministerial act by the Governor can not be enforced by the
Courts, is there not a radical defect in the laws? To
provide that the Governor is to act as a mere clerk in the
issue of a charter, and at the same time to hold that by
reason of his lofty office no compulsory process can be
used to enforce such issue, is a state of affairs which
cries out for correction.
The correction may be in one of three ways--either
the action of the Governor may be dispensed with altogether, as it was in the Ship-Canal Corporation Act of
24 June, 1895, P. L. 221, or the Governor may be made
amenable to mandamus proceedings by Act of Assembly,
if such an Act would be enforcible, or else the Governor
or a commission should be given a discretion in the granting of railroad charters. In the writer's opinion, the establishment of a commission which should pass on application
for railroad charters, would be an excellent thing.. It
would be in line with legislation in such important states
as New York, Massachusetts and Illinois, which legislation is based on the theory that the right of eminent
domain is of so high a nature that it ought not be granted
in any case except to a company whose purposes had been
investigated and found to be of public benefit and advantage. Even in Pennsylvania the correctness of this
principle has been recognized in the establishment by the
Act of 20 June, i90i, P. L. 577, of a board which must
approve the incorporation of an elevated underground
and elevated passenger railway, before it can secure a
charter.
This completes our consideration of the incorporation
of railroad companies, except that it may be remarked
that for no apparent reason this class of corporations
alone has been relieved of the necessity of causing its articles of association to be recorded in the county or counties in which its operations are carried on. There is
no reason for this omission, and it should not be permitted to continue.
Our company being incorporated and organized, let
us take up the statutes which deal with-
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II.

THE BUILDING OF THE ROAD.

The first step in building the road is the raising of
money. This can be done either by issuing stock or by
borrowing, and borrowing, as a practical matter, means
borrowing on bonds secured by mortgage, although of
course money may be borrowed on open account or on
notes. The public has a very deep interest in the amount
of stock and bonds which a railroad has outstanding,
for students of transportation charges tell us that rates
are regulated by railroad companies much more with
reference to the quantity of stock and bonds to pay diviends and interest on which money must be earned, than
with reference to anything else. If then we desire low
fares, we must see to it that stock and bonds are not
issued except for a consideration which will increase the
earning power of the road to an amount at least equal
to the added burden of dividends and interest assumed by
the issue. 8
The legislation prescribing a minimum capitalization
already has been discussed. The maximum capitalization
of railroads at first was unlimited: Act of 24 March, 1865,
P. L. 43, then it was fixed by Section 6 of the Act of 1868 at
$6o,ooo per mile, increased by the Act of 4 June, 1883,
P. L. 67, to $I50,OOO per mile, and all limitation as to
amount again removed by the Act of 9 February, i9oi,
P. L. 3.- The amount of stock issued is not nearly so
material as is the consideration for its issue. The Constitution of 1874 provided (Art. XVI. Sec. 7), "No corporation shall issue stock or bonds, except for money, labor
done, or money or property actually received." The
section is not self-executing, but no attempt was made
to carry it into effect until the Act of 7 May, 1887, P. L.
94, was passed. Section i provides that if stock is to
BSG important has the prevention of over-capitalization been deemed,
that in two states, Massachusetts and Texas, no stock or bonds may be
issued without the approval of the railroad commissions of those States,
and a similar requirement has been inserted in the proposed draft for
a national railroad corporation act:-v. Congressional Record of xS
May, 19o6, p. 7104.
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be paid for in money, an amount of money equal to the
par value of the stock actually must be paid into the
treasury of the company before the stock is issued, and
adequate penalties are imposed for a violation of the
mandate. Section 2 provides that if stock is to be issued
as the price of property or labor, the price paid in stock
shall not be in excess of the price for which the property could be bought in money. In other words, $5o.oo
in cash, or property or labor which could be bought for
$50.00 in cash, must be paid for $5o.oo of stock, not
stock having a market value of $50.00, but stock having

a face value of $5o.oo.9 As long as stock is worth par,
these provisions are adequate, but just as soon as the
stock becomes worth less than par .the Act becomes impractical, and when it becomes worth more than par the
Act becomes ineffective. Suppose, for instance, that
one-fifth of the company's property is destroyed, so that
the actual value of its stock drops to $40.0o a share, and

the company desires to replace the property destroyed,
paying therefor by issuing new stock or treasury stock.
If it can give only $5o.oo of stock (actual value $40.00)
for property which sells for $5o.oo cash, who will sell to
the company? Or suppose the franchise proves valuable
and the stock rises to $75.00 a share, market value. If
now the company can give $5o.oo of stock (actual value
$75.00) for $50.00 worth of property, how is the public

protected against the issue of stock upon inadequate
consideration? The difficulty with the Act is that it
attempts to legislate an impossibility, namely, that stock
always shall be worth par. Railroad companies should
be allowed to sell their stock for cash or for property or
labor at a rate which will give the company and the
public the benefit of the fair market value of the stock,
as they are, by the same Act, given the benefit of the
fair market value of the company's bonds.'
In discussing the question of borrowing, we shall consider only the particular method of borrowing, which is on
'9Cf. Donald. v. Amer Smelting Etc. Co., 48 Atl. 77x, N.J.
20Page 25,

infra.
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bonds secured by mortgage, because this is by far the most
frequently used method. Even without statutory authority a railroad company could issue stock, but its power
to mortgage, if not its road alone, at least its road and
franchises, depends entirely on legislative permission."
Section 2 of the Act of 1849 conferred on railroad companies an unrestricted right to mortgage all their "goods,
chattels and estate, real and personal, of what kind and
nature soever." The act of 8 April, 186i, P. L. 259, providing for the formation of a new company by those for
whose account a road sold at sheriff's sale is bought, permits the issue of bonds bearing interest at not more than
7%, up .to the amount of capital stock, which probably
means capital stock paid in,' and. not, as the wording
would indicate, capital stock authorized, secured by
mortgage on the real and personal property of the road,
and also on its franchises. Section 8 of the Act of i868
amended the Act of 1849 by including in the property
which could be mortgaged, the franchises of the company,
and by providing that the bonds should not exceed
double the amount of the paid-up stock. The maximum
interest was fixed at 7% and maturity of the bonds could
not be postponed more than fifty years.
The next Act is that of 13 March, 1873, P. L. 45, entitled
"An Act to authorize railroad corporations to secure
the payment of their bonds and obligations by a mortgage upon their property, rights and franchises." The
issue of bonds bearing not over 7% interest, secured by
mortgage of the road and franchises, is authorized. This
was almost exactly what the Act of 1868 had provided
and one must look very closely to see what object the Act
of 1873 was passed to accomplish. It contains a proviso,
"This act shall not be construed to empower any railroad
company to issue bonds in excess of the capital stock
actually paid in." If this Act was intended to amend
the Act of 1868, which permits the issue of bonds to twice
2"Pittsburg & Connellsville R. R. Co. v. Allegheny Co., 63 Pa. 126,
1869,
22
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the capital stock paid in, its infelicitous wording defeats
the accomplishment of that intention, for instead of providing that bonds shall not be issued to an amount
exceeding the paid-in capital stock, it simply says that the
Act shall not be construed to permit the issue of a greater
amount. Railroads which could take advantage of the
Act of 1868 could issue bonds up to twice their paid-in
capital under that Act, and, since they had no need at
all for the Act of 1873, they were not affected by its
proviso. The difference between the Act of i868 and that
of 1873, is that Section 8 of the Act of i868 applied only to
railroads incorporated under that Act, while the Act of
1873 applied to "any railroad corporation of this Commonwealth." After the passage of the Act of 1873, railroad companies incorporated under the Act of i868 could
create twice as big a bonded indebtedness as other railroad companies, although no apparent reason suggests
itself for such a distinction. It has been impliedly suggested that the difference between the two acts was, that
the Act of x868 permitted the issue of bonds only for the
construction and equipment of the road, while the Act
of 1873 contained no such restriction.'
It is difficult,
however, to see just what legitimate use of the proceeds
of bonds is not permitted by the earlier act, unless, perhaps, their use for the operation of the road. Why companies should be allowed to issue bonds to twice their
paid up capital stock to construct and equip their road,
and to only half that amount for other purposes, is not
apparent.
The Act of 8 May, 1876, P. L. 135, should have sent cold
shivers down the backs of those interested in narrowgauge roads. It confers on narrow-gauge railroad companies with roads not over 5o miles long and having a
subscribed capital stock of not more than $500,000.00

the right to issue mortgage bonds, in exactly the language
used in Section 8 of the Act of i868. The importance of
this grant of power lies in the implication that narrow"3 Fidelity Co. v. West Pa. R. R. Co. 138 Pa. 494, i8go, at 498.
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gauge roads would not have possessed, without further
legislation, the rights and privileges of the Act of 1868.
What rights and privileges have they then? The act
of 18 March, 1875, P. L. 28, under which they are
incorporated, does not contain any grant of powers, and
none has been made by subsequent legislation except
this power conferred by the Act of 1876 to issue mortgage
bonds. Whence do they derive the right to construct
branches, whence the right to increase their capital stock,
whence the right of eminent domain even? Except for
the Act of 1876, no one would think to question the existence of these rights, for they would assume that narrow-gauge railroad companies, incorporated, as the Act
of 18 March, 1875, states, "under the provisions of the Act
approved April 4, i868," would have the same rights,
powers and privileges and be subject to the same restrictions and liabilities as cdmpanies organized under the
Act of 1868. Either the Act of 1876 was superfluous or
else many more acts are needed to give narrow-gauge
railroad companies the powers which they should have.
The Act of 12 June, 1878, P. L. 183, recites that doubts
had arisen whether the Act of 13 March 1873 enabled
a railroad company to mortgage its rolling stock and other
personal property. This somewhat unreasonable doubt 2
is settled in favor of the power, and the Act proceeds
to provide that "such mortgage shall not be valid against
persons not parties thereto, unless recorded in every
county in which the mortgaged property is situated,"
and that cars and engines mortgaged shall be marked in
some conspicuous place with the name of the trustee in
said mortgage. There is much in these provisoes which
invites criticism. In the first place to render unrecorded
mortgages invalid as against "persons not parties thereto," without excluding persons who have actual notice,
is scarcely consistent with the purpose of the recording
acts, which is only to provide a substitute for actual notice.
If the penalty for failure to record the mortgage is too
heavy, this is compensated by the fact that there is no
24
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penalty at all for failure to mark the cars and engines.
In the second place it is difficult to tell just where the
mortgage is to be recorded, for the county in which cars
and engines are situated is not easily determinable. They
are almost like running water in that they have no fixed
or permanent abode. Finally, if the second proviso was
intended to brand the mortgaged rolling stock with the
evidence of its subjection, there should have been a requirement that it be marked with the name of the mortgagee in cases where there was no trustee, and that the
word "trustee" or "mortgagee" should follow the name,
as it must in the case of a lease. '
The almost special Act of 22 April, 1879, P. L. 31, permits railroad companies the time for the completion of
whose railroads is about to expire, and which have not
completed their railroads "for the purpose of continuing
and completing the construction thereof, to borrow, on
mortgage of their property and franchises, or otherwise,
such sum or sums of money as may be necessary, at any
rate of interest not exceeding 7% per annum." The
importance of this Act consists in the fact that it does
not limit the amount of bonds which may be issued, by
the amount of stock paid up.
The Act of 4 June, 1883, P. L. 67, simply provides that
railroad companies shall not issue over $150,000 of stock
and $150,000 of bonds per mile. We can not refrain from

complaining of the use of the word "mile" in this indefinite way. Does it mean per mile authorized or per mile
constructed? If it be against the policy of the law
"to permit bonds to be issued upon the security of mere
moonshine," as Mr. Justice Clark declares in Philadelphia
v. Ridge Avenue Railway Company,

102

Pa.

19o,

1883,

certainly the amount of bonds should depend upon the
constructed mileage of the road, and yet, in view of the
fact that this provision is in context with capital stock,
the amount of which both initially and subsequently is
fixed by the authorized mileage, the question becomes very
doubtful. Again, does the word mean per mile of track,
255

July 1883, P. L. 176.
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or per mile of length of road? The latter is the more natural meaning, and yet it seems unfair that a four-track
trunk-line should have no greater borrowing capacity
than a single-track branch line. The Act, to our minds,
does not destroy the ratio between the stock and bonds,
as fixed by the Acts of 1868 and 1873: it remains true
that railroads incorporated under the Act of 1868 may
issue bonds to twice the amount of the paid-in capital stock,
and that other roads may issue them to an equal amount,
only a maximum of $15o,ooo.oo per mile is fixed.
We have considered before 28 the effect of the Act
of 7 May, 1887, P. L. 94, so far as it concerns the consideration for which stock may be issued. On the question
of bonds, it provides that none may be issued until the
full amount subscribed of stock is fully paid for, nor
may they ever exceed in amount the capital stock paid
for, nor shall they be issued for less than their fair
market value. The prohibition against the issue of
bonds until all of the subscribed stock is paid for, is
entirely new, but the provision that there shall not be
more bonds than paid-up stock is in accord with the Act
of 1873, and undoubtedly repeals Section 8 of the Act of
1868 in so far as it permits the issue of bonds to double
the amount of paid-up stock. The effect of the simple
statement that the bonds shall be issued for not less than
their fair market value is, we think, to overthrow the
theory which had caused the insertion in almost
all of the Acts so far considered on the subject of the
issue of bonds, of a limitation on the rate of interest to
be paid. Railroads, in their inception, naturally were
considered highly speculative investments, and they could
not have borrowed money, particularly in the middle of
the nineteenth century, when money commanded high
premiums, unless they were permitted to enter into valid
contracts to pay over 6% interest. Accordingly, the Act of
26 July, 1842, P. L. 430, Section II, as explained by the Act
of 25 February, 1856, P. L. 61, sanctioned the issue of
bonds at prices so much below par that legal interest on
6 Page 20,

supra.
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the face of the bonds would yield much more than legal
interest on the price paid for them. The later statutes
provided that the bonds should bear interest at not
over 7%, but whether this meant that they could not
be sold below par any more so as to yield over 7% on
the selling price, is not clear, although if the Acts were
construed so as to permit this, the limitation of 7% expressed would be done away with entirely. The Act of
1887, however, settled the question in a sensible way, by
permitting the sale at the fair market value of the bonds,
whether at that value they yielded 7% or more. The
only criticism that the Act of 1887 seems to call for is,
that in cases where bonds are issued for property or labor,
no schedule of the property or labor acquired and price
paid therefor is required to be filed, as, under Section
2, it is in the case of stock paid for in property or labor.
An exception to the law that bonds can be issued only
up to the amount of capital paid in, and not in excess of
$15o,ooo.oo a mile, is made by the Act of 31 May, i887,
P. L. 275, which permits railroads elevating or depressing
their tracks in cities, peculiarly expensive work, to borrow, on bond and mortgage, "such amount of money per
mile of elevated or depressed railroad as may be necessary
to pay for the construction thereof, together also with
such damages, direct and consequential, as may result
therefrom. "
Finally comes the Act of 9 February, i9O1, P. L. 3,

which authorizes all corporations, including railroad
companies, to increase their stock and indebtedness to
such an amount as they may deem necessary to accomplish and carry on and enlarge the business and purposes
of the corporation. This Act does not seem to have any
other effect on railroads than to remove the limit of
$150,000.00 of bonds per mile fixed by the Act of 4

June, 1883, P. L. 67, if it has even that effect;' it
does not seem to change the salutary provision of the
Act of 7 May, 1887, forbidding the issue of bonds in
excess of the paid-up stock. Is this true also of the
tCom. v. Buffalo & SusquehannaR. R. Go.,
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Act of 22 April, 1905, P. L. 280, which amends the
Act of 9 February, i901, by providing that the stock
or indebtedness of corporations may be increased to any
amount deemed necessary, "without regard to the
amount of the other, regardless of any limitation upon
the amount of either prescribed in any general or special
law regulating any such corporation"? Does this mean
that railroad companies may issue mortgage bonds
whether their subscribed stock is paid for or not, to an
amount exceeding their paid-up stock? The presumption
that it was intended by the Act of 1905 thus radically to
change a policy adhered to for so many years, should not be
indulged in: rather should it be taken that the intention
was to change only such of the earlier Acts as can not
possibly stand with it. In the first place, nothing is said
in the Act of 1905 as to when the debt may be increased,
so there is no reason to consider the Act of 1887 repealed
as to its provision that bonds may not be issued until
the subscribed stock is paid for. Again, the Act of 1905
speaks of "indebtedness," while the Act of 1887 speaks
of corporate bonds, "or other certificates of indebtedness,"
and it may well be that the two could stand together,
so that while bonds or notes could not be issued to more
than the paid-up stock, debts might be incurred in other
ways, to an unlimited amount. In view of the fact that
one object of the Act of 1887 was to protect investors from
being tempted to buy corporate obligations which had
no real security, this distinction would be very reasonable,
for there would be no danger of investors buying unsubstantial book accounts against railroad companies.
In the third place, the Act of 1905 provides simply
that the indebtedness may be increased, while the Act
of 1887 provides that bonds or other certificates shall
not be issued in excess of the paid-up stock. Is there
anything contradictory here? Railroad companies may
authorize a bond issue of $i,ooo,ooo.oo even if their
capital be only $5o,ooo.oo but if only $25,000.00 of the

capital be paid up, bonds can be issued only to that
amount. Of course on this theory the Act of 1905
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would have no practical effect as to railroads, for a corporation does not desire to have bonds which it can not
issue, but this is not fatal to the construction.
Admitting that there still is a limit on the time when,
and the amounts in which, stock and bonds may be issued, the question remains, what is the penalty for
issuing them at forbidden times or in forbidden amounts?
Until the Act of 7 May, 1887, P. L. 94, was passed there
was no penalty. If bonds were issued to an amount many
times in excess of the paid-in capital, there was no punishment provided for those responsible for the unloading
of these insecurities on the public, and so flagrant
were the frauds perpetrated that Judge Williams in the
Western Pennsylvania R. R. case 8 strongly advocated
the imposition of a punishment. The Act of 1887 attempted to supply the deficiency. Stock issued without
full consideration, and bonds issued before the subscribed
amount of stock was fully paid for, or in excess of it or
not at their fair market value, were declared void, and
the officers of the company assenting to the illegal issue
were declared guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by a
fine of not over $5,ooo.oo.

The declaration that stock

and bonds are void does not seem to have much force,
for as against bona fide purchasers for value, they are
just as good as if issued lawfully," and even purchasers
with notice of their invalidity, are protected at least to
the extent of the money actually paid for them.' The
penal clause fails to include one class of persons to which
Judge Williams thought that it should apply, namely,
the financial agents who negotiate the bonds, and a minimum as well as a maximum fine should have been fixed.
Here are fourteen Acts relating to the question of the
issue of stock and bonds by a railroad company. Could
a stronger argument be made for the necessity of a revision than the mere statement of this fact.?
Let us assume that our company safely has threaded
2SFidelity Ins. Co. v. Western Pa. R. R. Co., 138 Pa. 494, 1890.
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the maze of the preceding Acts, and finds itself armed
with legal authority and with financial ability to construct
its road. It now will undertake the choice of a route,
and the actual construction of its road thereon.
In considering the legislation of which it must avail
itself, we shall find ourselves principally dealing with the
Act of February 19, 1849, P. L. 79, for after almost sixty

years, it is to this Act, passed when railroads as we know
them now were undreamt of, that we must go to find the
most important power of railroads, to wit, the right of
eminent domain. Let us examine Section io of the Act,
which confers that right. First, what help does it give us
in choosing our route? It permits the president and
directors'to survey and ascertain, then to "locate, fix, mark
and determine," such route as they deem expedient, not
passing through any burying ground, or place of public
worship, or any dwelling-house in the occupancy of the
owner or owners thereof, without his, her or their consent,
and to construct a railroad on such route. This sketchy
treatment of the method of exercising the right of eminent
domain is one of the gravest defects of the Railroad Act.
When we think that this right entitles its possessors to
take property against the will of the owners thereof, we
should expect to see all reasonable restrictions placed
upon it. But look at the exact wording of the Act: "The
president and directors of such company shall have power
and authority by themselves, their engineers, superintendents, agents, artisans and workmen, to survey, ascertain,
locate, fix, mark and determine such route for a railroad as
they may deem expedient, not however," etc. The power
of location here given is a power to preempt land, a kind of
notice that the company proposes to condemn the land.
From the time the road is located over a man's property he
ceases to have a clear title to it,"' and no other company
can condemn it,' and whenever the company decides
to condemn it, it may. Indeed, if the company does not
Gallery, 184 Pa. 146, 1898.
Williamsport & North Branch R. R. v. P. & E. R. R., 14x Pa.
407, 1891.
SI Johnson v.
2
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use a part of the land condemned, and in no way shows
that it has condemned it, even after 20 years adverse
possession of such part of the land, the company can reclaim it from a remote vendee of the owner at the time
of the location, although neither the owner nor any
subsequent vendee ever knew or could have learned of
the location '. To equalize this condition, the owner
after the road has been located over his property, may
begin proceedings to compel the company to pay for
it. Considering the important effect of the act of location one would look for numerous formalities surrounding
its exercise, chiefly one would look for some requirement
which would give the person whose land is included in the
location, notice of that fact, so that he might begin the
proceedings to which he is entitled, and for some requirement which would enable another railroad company intending to build a road in the same region, to determine
what land had been preempted. But we find none of
that: according to the act, it seems clear to the writer
that the location may be made by an engineer, superintendent, agent, artisan or workman as well as by the
president and directors, for those subordinates are given
just as much right to locate the route as they are
given to survey or mark it, and as it never has been
supposed that it required the president and directors
to survey or mark the route, it is not very easy to see
why it should be held that they alone can locate it. It
has been so held, however.'
But how do the president and directors locate the route? Simply by meeting
and passing a resolution that "such and such be and it
hereby is adopted as the location of the railroad of the
X Company." The resolution need not be published or recorded anywhere or at any time. In no place in the world,
it is submitted, is there displayed such carelessness and
indifference to the legalized confiscation of private property. Nine men may agree to form a railroad company,
without advertisement of notice of their intention to apply
3
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for a charter; they may become incorporated, without
recording their charter in the district where they intend
to build their road; they may organize their corporation,
without any hint or warning or notice to you or to any one
else; they may meet and decide to locate their railroad
through your land, and thereupon, unknown to you, your
land is doomed. Not even then are you told your fate.
For weeks and months you may hear nothing of the
company, you may sell your land even. Then suddenly,
a year after the road was located over your property,
perhaps months after you have sold it, the company may
inform you or your vendee that the land was appropriated
a year ago, and you are liable to your vendee for breach
of your covenant against incumbrances. Or you may
be a financier, who has discovered a rich field for a railroad, apparently theretofore undiscovered. You may
spend time and money in surveying a route through
virgin woods, in planning to construct a road in a district where no man ever thought to build, you may locate
your route and be about to enter upon the-work of construction, when the A. R. R. Co., of which no one ever
heard, turns up, and informs you that two days before
you located your route, it had held a meeting of its directors and fixed upon the same route. The temptation for
fraud which exists where the stake is so rich and the means
of attaining it so easy, is tremendous. The production
of a book in which is written that on a certain date,
a majority of the directors being present, it was resolved
to build a road on the route marked "A" is a matter
of so little difficulty, that it is only remarkable that it
does not occur oftener. Were the condition irremediable, it would be difficult to reconcile ourselves to it,
but in view of the fact that all that is necessary absolutely
to end it, is to provide that no location shall be complete
until a map and description of the route located on be
lodged for record with the Secretary of the Commonwealth
and until written notice be given to the owner of each
property included within the location, the condition
becomes inexcusable.
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After thus criticising the Railroad Law for its failure
to impose strict enough conditions upon the exercise
of the right of eminent domain, it seems strange to complain that it is not broad enough in its grant of that right
in other respects. It prohibits the location of railroads through cemeteries, places of public worship and
dwelling-houses occupied by their owners, without the
consent of such owners ' or upon streets, lanes or alleys
in incorporated cities.'
The first class of exceptions,
of course, is not based on any abstract principle of
policy, but on a sentimental idea which, while it is in
the abstract laudable, should not be permitted to
hinder the accomplishment of a great public work.
Mr. Justice Dean, in speaking of the exceptions of the
Act of 1849, says,' "It may be doubted whether if
the exigencies and necessities of the future had been foreseen as they are now known, the Legislature would, fifty
years ago, have imposed even such a restriction. A restriction of this kind does hamper, and does in many cases
obstruct great public improvements." Particularly in
the case of dwelling-houses has it been usual to "hold up"
the company. To project a line in such a way that it
will dodge all the homes, is not possible, and experience
has shown that the Act of 1849 has caused occupants of
dwellings which railroads require, to assume an attitude
of devoted attachment to their homesteads very suggestive of that religious scruple of the Boers which, according to Max O'Rell, leads them to refuse to hire out
their halls for dancing, except at double the ordinary
rental. The unwisdom of the Act of 1849 in regard to
dwelling-houses has been demonstrated so clearly that
their exemption from condemnation has not been allowed
in the Underground and Elevated Passenger Railway Act
of 7 June, igoi, P. L., 523, Sec. 8, although the exemption
of cemeteries and places of worship is repeated. We
shall see later how even these favored spots have been
'Act of 1849.
" Act of 4 April, x868, P. L. 62, Sec. 12.
Dryden v. Pittsburg, Va. &? Charleston Ry., 208 Pa. 316, 1904.
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sacrificed not, in the writer's opinion, by the Legislature,
but by the Supreme Court, to economic demands.'
The question of the wisdom of requiring municipal consent for the occupation of streets, is a very debatable one,
and as the legislation in Pennsylvania adequately carries
out the present policy of this State on that subject, it
is perhaps not within the scope of this article to criticise
it. And yet the writer can not refrain from saying that
in his opinion the policy is wrong. A railroad corporation of course is a creation of the State; so is a municipal
corporation; and why one creature of the State should be
thus entirely at the mercy of another, is not perceived.
The same theory which subordinates to the carrying out
of a great public improvement, the private property of
one man or of a collection of men in any other part of
the State, should subordinate thereto the common property of men in an incorporated city.
Let us see what the situation in Pennsylvania is.
Section 12 of the Act of April 4, 1868, P. L. 62, provides
that the act shall not be construed "to authorize any corporation, formed under this Act, to enter upon and occupy
any street, lane or alley in any incorporated city in this
Commonwealth without the consent of such city having
been first obtained." The wording of the Act is not very
broad, and it seems very reasonable to suppose that the
mere crossing of a street would not be within the prohibition of the Act. But that has been decided to the contrary,3 9 It would have been even more reasonable to suppose that the Act did not prevent companies from running
their roads over or under streets, for it is well settled that
the land under a street and the space above it is not
affected at all by the opening of a street, but is just as
much private and just as little public property, as the
land under or space over a cornfield in the farming-districts of an unsettled county. Why it should be any
'1 It is curious to notice that in the Act of io July, igoi, P. L. 632,
authorizing certain schools to condemn land for the extension of their
grounds, there is no restriction at all on the kind of property which
may be condemned; even cemeteries and churches are not exempted.
1 Pittsburgv. Pittsburg, Carnegie & Western R. R., 205 Pa. 13, 19o3.
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more sacred is inconceivable, and yet the Court has decided that even to cross a street above grade requires
municipal consent.' In other words, since there is no
municipality without streets, our legislation, puts it
absolutely within the power of a city to interrupt a
work for the good of the whole State. In the case of
street passenger railways it is proper that the municipality should have the right to admit or exclude them,
for inasmuch as the benefit to be derived is local only,
the local authorities should be entitled to decide whether
the disadvantages exceed the benefit. But since a railroad confers a benefit on the entire State, no municipality should have the right to block it simply because of
local inconveniences. These are the words of Chief
Justice Gibson in the earliest important case wherein the
right of a railroad company to occupy city streets, was
considered: "Were it not for the universality of the public
sovereignty, the public lines of communication, by railroads and canals, might be cut by the authority of every
petty borough through which they pass; a doctrine to
which Pennsylvania can not submit, and which it would
be dangerous to urge."41--but which, substituting the
word "incorporated city" for "borough" it now has
adopted. And yet even the writer realizes that some restriction should be placed on the occupancy of public
streets by railroads. In his opinion, however, that restriction should be imposed before incorporation rather than
after. If a body of men desires to form a company which
shall have the right to occupy the streets of a city, its
application for a charter should indicate that, and before
its charter is granted, a competent commission should
decide whether or not this right of occupation should be
given, and on what terms. Thus the proposed incorporators will know from the beginning whether they will
be able to build their road as they plan, and will not have
to go to the expense of incorporating, surveying their
4OPhila. v. P. R. R. R. Co., 7 Pa. C. C. 390, x889.
41P. & Trenton R. R. Co.'s Case, 6 Whart. 25, 1840.
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route and making all plans, in doubt as to what will happen when they reach the doors of a municipality.
We are not concerned with the procedure in cases of
the taldng of property under the right of eminent domai
that being a question of practice rather thanof substantive law. We may remark, however, that the provisions
of the Act of 1849 on this subject are as loose and as incomplete as they are on the subject of location. No appeal was given from the report of the viewers when confirmed by the Court of Common Pleas, so that a jury
trial was not permitted to either party. This was remedied, however, by the Act of 9 April, i856, P. L. 288.
The proviso to Section io of the Act of 1849 required the
company to make ample compensation, or tender adequate
security for land or materials to be taken, before their
taking, but Section ix, although presumably intended to
specify the procedure, does not require the payment of
*compensation or the tender of security before entry.
There is one matter in this regard to which attention
must be called, and that is, the elements to be considered
by the viewers in estimating the damages to be awarded
to the owners of land taken by a railroad company. These
are particularized in Section iiof the Act of 1849, and
subsequent legislation has not added a word to that
section or taken one away; indeed the Act of 4 May, I9o5,
P. L. 38o, providing a system by which railroad companies
may change the location of bridges, repeats verbatim the
following provision of Section ii: "The said viewers...
shall estimate and determine the quantity, quality and
value of said lands so taken and occupied, or so to be taken
or occupied, or the materials so used or taken away, as
the case may be, and having a due regard to and making
just allowance for the advantages which may.have resulted, or which may seem likely to result, to the owner
or owners of said land or materials, in consequence of the
opening of said railroad, and of the construction of works
connected therewith; and, after having made a fair and
just comparison of said advantages and disadvantages,
they shall estimate and determine whether any, and if any,
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what amount of damages has been or may be sustained
and to whom payable, and make a report thereof to the
said court." Exactly what facts are the viewers to consider? Just two, it is submitted,-first "the quantity,
quality and value of said lands so taken and occupied,"
and second, the advantages likely to result to the owners
thereof in consequence of the opening of the road and
the construction of its works. Our contention is that
the provision is plainly violative of Article XVI, Section
8 of the Constitution of 1874, which requires corporations
exercising the right of eminent domain to pay for property
taken, injured or destroyed. The Act of 1849 provides
only for compensation for property taken, because the
Constitution of 1838 then in force (Art. VIII, Sec. 4) did
not require payment except for property taken. When
the Constitution of 1874 was passed to correct the injustice resulting from the old Constitution, the Act of
1849 should have been changed to conform to the new
requirements, but it never was, and in condemnation
cases it is usual to allow damages measured not merely
by the value of the property taken but also by the amount
injured or destroyed, and to assume that this is according to the Act of 1849.
A very important practical question which arises is,
when must the building of the road be begun and when
must it be finished? Upon this question, the legislation
is extremely unsatisfactory, Section 5 of the Act of 1868
providing as follows: "The said company shall commence
the proposed road, if not more than fifty miles in length,
with at least one track, within two years from their organization as aforesaid, and prosecute the work on the same
with due diligence, and open and complete the same within
five years, and shall have an additional six months
[changed to one year by the Act of 8 June, [874, P. L.
277] to complete their road for each twenty-five miles
more than the fifty miles aforesaid: ProvidedL the road
shall be opened for use in all cases when fifty miles in
length of track are laid." Let us divide this Act into
provisions as to beginning the road, and provisions as to
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completing it. The company is to commence the road, if
not over fifty miles long, with at least one track, within
two years from its organization. In the first place, this
clause apparently does not provide when roads over fifty
miles long must be commenced, and as to the beginning
of such roads there is therefore no provision. In the second
place, the words "commence the proposed road . . . with
at least one track" have not, it seems to us, any intelligible
meaning. If they mean that the proposed road must be
commenced by the construction of one track, the important
question left open is, how much track must be constructed? Surely the Act can not have meant that the
whole fifty miles of road must be tracked in two years,
and the road completed in five, for it is well known that
the laying of the track is about the last step in the construction of a road, and if the track were laid in two
years, the road easily could be completed in one year
more. There are not any decisions throwing light on the
meaning of this clause, and all that can be said safely is,
that fifty miles of road must be completed within five years
after the company is organized. Even to this provision
there is the objection that it does not except time during
which the company, through no fault of its own, is prevented from going ahead with its work. Suppose, for
instance, that its right to take property is resisted on the
ground that it is not a railroad within the meaning of the
Act of i868, as in the Sparks case," and an injunction is
asked to prevent the condemnation of a right of way, the
litigation consequent on such a case might take several
years, and the end of the time given the company to build
might expire, before it would have been legally possible
for the company to commence building. Or again, part
of its route might be in an incorporated city, and the
negotiations to secure municipal consent to the entrance
therein might consume years, as, for instance, the negotiations of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company to build
under certain parts of New York City have. The legislation as to the time of beginning and completing work
2
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should be reduced to practical form, and should include
provisions whereby delays not the fault of the company
should be excepted in computing the time allowed.'
We now have considered at length, yet not exhaustively
by any means, the legislation under which the road is
built, from the raising of money to actual construction.
There remain only the Acts dealing with the development
of the railroad.
(To be concluded in the October number.)
4 The Street Railway Act of 14 May, 1889, P. L. 211, Section 16,
requires construction to be begun within one year "after the consent
of the proper local authorities * * * shall have been obtained, and
shall be completed within two years thereafter."

